CUP (2016) h/b 357pp £30 (ISBN 9781107152711)
H. takes the story from the middle Roman republic to the periods that witnessed the end of the empire in the West, first in AD 476 and again after the Justinian ‘revival’ and the Roman defeat at the battle of Yarmuck against the Muslims in 636. Since the power of Rome was expressed first and foremost through its military might, what interests H. most is the difference between the middle republican, and the imperial, armies and the reciprocal light they shed on each other.
For H., the armies of the middle republic were ‘cohesive and disciplined’, prepared both to defend themselves and extend Rome’s boundaries, able to bring on board Latin and then Italian manpower, and becoming more capable and confident the more victories they won. The financial muscle this generated enabled them to build fleets, and their increasing experience and mastery of the leadership skills and ‘organisational techniques’ served them well as they expanded across the Mediterranean. A driving force behind all this was the desire for glory and the material rewards it brought with it, all typical of a warrior society and deeply imbued in a highly competitive aristocratic class. Fides on the one hand and virtus on the other were the rhetoric behind the achievements; libertas too, but for whom, and in what sense? Largely, it seems, for the ruling class to have its share of power (H. takes a different view). The demand among the poor for all this wealth to be more equitably divided up, the intransigence of the senate, and the willingness of individual dynasts to solve the problem by force in their own interests, brought the whole edifice down.
With the empire after Tiberius came a career-based, professional (and a far more expensive) army. The stock of self-replenishing, battle-hardened veterans across the population disappeared. Emperors were not necessarily experienced army commanders, and men who were in that position presented a threat to them. So control of empire and defence against revolt or incursion rather than glorious expansion now became the priority. Emperors themselves may never have been wholly secure, but peace and its accompanying economic benefits, secure imperial structures supported by provincial elites, and widespread loyalty to the ‘idea’ of Rome (encouraged by the benefits of citizenship) were firmly enough embedded to withstand change at the top, even during the tumultuous third century.
H. argues that the root cause of the collapse of the Western empire was, despite all Diocletian’s reforms of the late 3rd C, the inability of the state to raise tax revenue sufficient enough to fund, train and arm an army large or committed enough to repel the Germanic invasions and later defeat better trained Muslim armies. An unstable central government, an irresponsible social elite, a military with divided loyalties, partially caused by an intolerant Christianity, and an increasing disenchantment among the general populace for what Rome stood for all played their part. H. suggests (on little evidence, he agrees) that this last development was down to ‘social oppression’. There must have been a huge number of social oppressors.
There is more to ‘power’, however, than military might, however central that was. H. also explores power in relation to gender (i.e. women), society (slaves feature large) and most interestingly ideas.
H. admits this densely-packed read is something of a summary of many years of scholarly engagement. The consequence is that argument sometimes tends toward assertion and rather abrupt dismissal of alternative views. Since the text is fully referenced across to a large bibliography, the evidence is there to be pursued by those who need it, but the vast and deeply impressive scope of this ‘summary’ does not make it an altogether easy read.
Peter Jones