Oxford (2018) h/b 656pp £110 (ISBN 9780198790662)
Take the Muziris papyrus. This trading contract, composed in Alexandria (though its find spot is unknown) and published in 1985, is written in Greek and dated to the 2nd C AD. It describes a shipment of goods unloaded somewhere along the Egyptian Red Sea and bound for Alexandria, for which a loan had been raised in Muziris, whence all these goods had originated i.e. in India (perhaps Pattanam, in the south-west corner, where large quantities of Roman amphorae have been found). It details elephant tusks, nard and textiles to a total value of some 7 million sestertii (after the 25% customs duty) and e.g. payments due to camel- and donkey-drivers for their shipment across land. Pliny gives figures that could suggest the value of goods imported into Egypt from Muziris alone might be c. 500 million ss a year. What might that indicate for the amount of revenue collected through customs duties from the rest of the empire?
It is finds like this, duplicated many times over in recent years, that have finally brought back into fashion what Rostovsteff (1926) and Tenney Frank (the 1930s) had pointed out some ninety years ago—that the Roman economy was based on something far more substantial than the mere subsistence agriculture for which Jones and Finley had argued in the 1970s. Indeed, the sheer complexity of the trading world is staggering (the chapters casting new light on trade outside the empire with e.g. India and China are especially important). The purpose of W.-B.’s collection of 18 papers, with a general introduction, is to explore the issues which these finds raise over the period from the 1st C BC to c. AD 350. Combining documentary and archaeological evidence, its three sections cover state institutions, trade within the empire, and trade outside it, and cover trade in everything from ceramics, wood, stone, glass and textiles to silk, ivory, spices and pearls.
To put it in a nutshell: was Rome a purely market economy? Or did the state intervene in significant ways to serve its own needs through, e.g. bulk purchases of grain for the annona, olive oil, luxuries, military supplies; taxes and legal structures (especially arrangements for credit); incentives for shippers (transport costs seem to have been remarkably cheap); and infrastructure such as roads and harbours? And what of private trade? There is evidence that on the Nile private cargoes were carried alongside state requisitions. The massive infra-structure put in place by the state to facilitate its demand for exotic stone (surely ‘uneconomic’ except in terms of political capital) opened up the stone business to non-state traders. The point is that maintaining the peace across the empire, keeping traffic lanes open and the use of a (voluntary) common currency—all the state’s responsibility—provided an environment in which trade could flourish, raising the revenues to keep the plebs in work and to maintain elite lifestyles: the people expected something in return for the taxes that Rome levied. As a whole, the systems worked well for a pre-industrial society, and the revenues raised through customs duties were significant. But as B. emphasizes, the Roman economy cannot be pinned down: it was by turns, for example, laissez-faire, dirigiste or predatory depending on needs and local circumstances.
The impression that this fine collection of detailed and scholarly papers gives is how intelligently pragmatic Romans were when it came to managing the complexities of far-flung trade. In working up trade relationships, they were as well acquainted with the velvet glove as the iron fist, and all shades and styles of persuasion in between. It was all about the quae pro quibus: it was what worked that counted, while (that is) it did actually work, and if problems emerged in one part of the gigantic local and international trading area, there is no reason why they should have necessarily spread to other parts. There were many advantages in not having the internet or statistics for GDP.
Peter Jones